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Nation, State, and Cross-Strait Relations: 
Perspectives from Taiwan1
Horng-luen Wang
I. Introduction: An Overview of the 
National Question in Taiwan
The problems surrounding the theoretical understanding of 
“nation” and “state” in Taiwan are among the most intriguing and 
most confusing in the contemporary world. Some might know that 
there is a so-called “separatist” or “independence” movement, often 
referred to as Taiwanese nationalism, that intends to turn Taiwan into 
a nation; some others might also know that there have been tensions 
between Taiwan and China that could lead to devastating military con-
flicts, as made manifest in the two missile crises in 1996 and 2000.
I use “national question” as a general term to refer to those issues 
pertaining to Taiwan’s nation/nationalism, state, and cross-Strait rela-
tions. Although Taiwan’s national question has been attracting more 
and more attention from both within and outside Taiwan during the 
past decade, the growing awareness of this problem has unfortunately 
been beset with misconceptions and misunderstandings. The aim of 
this essay is to clarify these issues by providing an alternative per-
spective through which to analyze Taiwan’s national question. Such 
an analysis, it is hoped, may help bring new perspectives to break the 
current impasse.
I shall first point out and dispute the bias and insufficiencies of a 
number of popular images or “common sense” notions about Taiwan’s 
national question. Next, I shall advance an institutional approach with 
a global perspective to view the problem. I argue that Taiwan’s national 
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question is in essence an international problem embodied in institu-
tional settings of the Republic of China (ROC) nation. The recent esca-
lation of nationalist politics is the result of the growing institutional 
crises of the ROC nation, exacerbated by ethnic tensions within Taiwan 
and confounded by cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China. 
Consequently, the reduction of tensions and the avoidance of poten-
tial conflict between Taiwan and China can only come about through 
the efforts of people and states on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (i.e., 
a bottom-up solution) as well as an involvement of the international 
community.
II. Some Common Misunderstandings and Misconceptions
A. Regarding Taiwan’s National Question
Two popular views dominate the current understanding of Taiwan’s 
national question within the general public, both within and outside 
the island. The first is an ethnic explanation; the other is what can be 
called “the divided nation model.” In spite of their popularity, both 
views are neither sufficient for the purposes of explaining Taiwanese 
nationalism, nor do they provide a comprehensive understanding of 
Taiwan’s national question. As a matter of fact, the insufficiencies that 
emanate from these misunderstandings are partly accountable for what 
is at stake in the dispute surrounding Taiwan’s national question.
1. The Ethnic Explanation
Ethnic tensions and conflicts between two dichotomous groups (the 
so-called “Mainlanders” and the “Taiwanese”) are the most popular 
and convenient way of viewing Taiwan’s national question. It is often 
held that the Mainlanders (those who fled from mainland China to 
Taiwan with the exiled KMT regime in 1949, and their offspring) tend 
to favor a Chinese identity and opt for future reunification with China. 
On the other hand, the Taiwanese (mainly Holo- but sometimes includ-
ing the Hakka-speaking people who had settled on the island for sev-
eral generations before the wave of immigrants who arrived with the 
KMT) tend towards a Taiwanese identity and thus favor Taiwan Inde-
pendence (TI). Accordingly, the political camps can be divided roughly 
into two: the “Blue” (favoring unification) vs. the “Green” (favoring 
independence).
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The ethnic explanation is insufficient at best and misleading at 
worst in that the so-called ethnic conflicts between Mainlanders and 
Taiwanese are themselves part of the result rather than the cause of 
Taiwan’s national question. Imagine the following scenario: had Tai-
wan not been ceded to and colonized by Japan in 1895, and had Taiwan 
not been occupied by the exile KMT (Kuomintang, literally “national 
party”) regime from mainland China in 1949, then it would have been 
highly probable that there would not be any distinction at all between 
Mainlanders and Taiwanese. Put another way, the dichotomy between 
the two “ethnic groups” is itself the product of Taiwan’s national ques-
tion, in which Taiwan’s belonging to the state (be it the Qing Dynasty 
of imperial China, Japan, or the KMT) has been a shifting dispute.2
The ethnic explanation is impeded by the difficulty of characteriz-
ing Taiwanese nationalism, which runs against conventional wisdom 
about nations and nationalism and thus cannot be easily categorized. 
One of the most fatal and misleading characterizations of Taiwanese 
nationalism is to view it as a “separatist movement” that is comparable 
to, for example, Quebec vs. Canada or Catalonia vs. Spain. Quebec and 
Catalonia are separatist movements in that those national struggles 
seek separation from the states whose jurisdiction they are under. This, 
however, is not applicable to Taiwan. Contemporary Taiwan does not 
share the same political roof with China as Quebec does with Canada or 
Catalonia does with Spain. Hence the case for “Taiwan Independence” 
sounds rather confusing to many outsiders. The oft-asked question is: 
“Independence from whom?” If Taiwanese nationalism is understood 
as the struggle of the Taiwanese (the oppressed majority) against the 
Mainlanders (the ruling minority) during the KMT era, then why did 
nationalist politics in Taiwan escalate rather than decline after the year 
2000, when ethnic Taiwanese became the ruling majority and the pro-
Independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) replaced the KMT.
I am not suggesting that ethnic factors are irrelevant or unimportant 
in explaining Taiwan’s national question. However, to view the prob-
lem of Taiwan’s national question as originating from conflicts between 
these two ethnic groups is quite misleading. Ethnic problems and the 
national question are correlated, but they are not the same, nor can 
they be conflated with each other.
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2. The “Divided-Nation Model”
The other popular misconception concerning Taiwan’s national ques-
tion is to view Taiwan as a part of the divided Chinese nation, the other 
part being mainland China under the rule of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), with the national title “People’s Republic of China.” This 
view, held particularly in the early years, is still popular in scholarly 
discussions and is widely held by a majority of the Taiwanese popu-
lation even today (although, as will be shown below, the popularity 
of such a view has receded considerably in recent years). Using the 
“Divided Nation” model to explain Taiwan’s national question can be 
said to be only half-true, but the other half of that equation may help 
to illuminate the real nature of Taiwan’s national question that neces-
sitates further analysis.
Just like former Vietnam, pre-1990 Germany, and contemporary 
Korea, China and Taiwan viewed together were a divided nation, result-
ing from the Cold War structure after the Second World War. In this 
sense, Taiwan’s national question, from its inception, was indeed an 
international problem, as the prolonged division between China and 
Taiwan was a Cold War strategy. However, if we try to understand Tai-
wan’s national question from this divided nation model, it will become 
quite misleading—but by debunking such a misunderstanding, we 
can get closer to what is at stake in Taiwan’s national question. Let me 
elaborate this in two points.
Firstly, although the division between Taiwan and China resembles 
other divided nations after WWII, such a fact is neither well known nor 
officially recognized. People know that Vietnam was once divided into 
North and South, and the division ended after a protracted war. It is 
also widely known that there used to be two Germanys, which became 
reunified in a dramatic fashion in 1990. As for Korea, it has thus far 
remained divided into North and South, and such a fact has also been 
widely acknowledged around the world. The case of China and Tai-
wan, however, is rather different. Most states in the world endorse 
the so-called “One China policy,” which maintains that there is only 
one China in the world and that Taiwan is part of China. China, after 
all, is not considered a divided nation. Moreover, although Taiwan 
was once characterized as “Free China” before the 1970s, few people 
nowadays know that Taiwan bears the national title of “Republic of 
China” (ROC). Far fewer know that Taiwan/ROC is not recognized as 
a sovereign state. Quite the opposite, most people assume it is, because 
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it has its own government and army, exercises full democracy, and citi-
zens elect their own president through a direct voting system. Such a 
discrepancy has planted tragic seeds for Taiwanese nationalism. I shall 
get to this in a later section.
The second reason why the divided nation model does not fit Tai-
wan involves the democratic transformation of Taiwanese politics in 
the past few decades. Since the KMT took refuge in Taiwan in 1949, 
it has endeavored to maintain a Chinese identity and Chinese nation-
alism. Since 1988, when Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo 
to become the first “native-born” president, the situation began to 
change. Lee Teng-hui swung between Chinese and Taiwanese iden-
tities from time to time. Indeed, the momentum of nation building 
shifted from a Chinese nationalism (for unification) to a Taiwanese 
nationalism (for independence) during Lee’s 12-year presidential term. 
The shift reached its peak in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian won the pres-
idential election and the pro-Independence DPP became the ruling 
party. Since the DPP, established in 1987 and constituted in the main 
by Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, does not bear the memory of 
the Chinese civil war as the KMT does, the legacy of the civil war is 
denied. For pro-Independence nationalists, the divided nation model 
certainly does not apply to Taiwan, since they never consider Tai-
wan and China a divided nation that should be reunified. Quite the 
opposite! In their view, Taiwan and China are “two different nations” 
instead of “a nation divided in two.”
III. An Alternative Perspective and the Analytical Framework
If the ethnic explanation and the divided nation model cannot satisfac-
torily explain Taiwan’s national question, and if Taiwanese nationalism 
cannot be perceived as a “separatist movement” as it usually is, how 
else can it be understood? I argue that the question must be viewed 
globally, from an institutionalist approach, in which two factors are 
emphasized: the one institutional, the other global or international.
The institutionalist approach to nations and nationalism is first the-
orized by sociologist Rogers Brubaker in his path-breaking National-
ism Reframed. Drawing on the insights from institutionalism and new 
institutionalism in various disciplines, Brubaker proposed that nation 
and nationhood can be better understood, not as substance but as insti-
tutionalized form, not as collectivity but as practical category, and not 
as entity but as contingent event.3 In his original formulation, Brubaker 
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distinguishes between two aspects of institutionalization of nation-
hood and nationality: one concerning the territorial organization of 
political administration, the other concerning the classification of per-
sons.4 To take it a step further, I propose that such a distinction of insti-
tutions corresponds roughly to two “ideal types” of the nation-state: 
the civic-territorial model and the ethno-cultural model.5 While such 
a distinction might seem banal today, it nonetheless has important 
implications for our understanding of the institutions of the nation. 
The civic-territorial model essentially concerns the political organiza-
tion of the nation regarding sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship. 
The ethno-cultural model involves (re)presentation of the nation in 
the symbolic realm, including national culture, national history, the 
classification scheme of people, and the like. To be sure, no nation has 
in reality been founded solely on either of the two models. For those 
nations built on the ethno-cultural model, there are still institutions 
that define these nations in civic-territorial terms. Conversely, nations 
based on the civic-territorial model contain ethno-cultural elements in 
defining their nationhood. The weaving of these two types of institu-
tions actualizes the existence of a specific nation. These two types of 
institutions, in turn, furnish the grids of the classification schemes on 
the political/territorial and the cultural/cognitive maps, respectively, 
on the worldwide level. They are highly correlated to each other, but 
neither can be reduced to the logic of the other.
Moreover, according to the property of relativity that we learn from 
the theory of new institutionalism, whether a social pattern or practice 
can be seen as an institution depends on the context of our analysis.6 
In the context of nationhood and nationality, the property of relativ-
ity brings us to what is known as the “institutionalist theory of world 
polity,” developed by John Meyer and his colleagues.7 Institutions of 
nationhood and nationality have to perform in two relative contexts: 
the domestic/national level and the global/international level.
Combining the above discussions, we can obtain a two-by-two table 
according to “types of institutions” and “levels of analysis” respec-
tively. (See Table 1.)
With this analytical framework, I argue that the existence of a nation 
is hinged upon an ensemble of intersecting institutions that can be 
classified into civic-territorial and ethno-cultural types. Both types of 
institutions, moreover, have to be articulated on both the domestic 
and international levels. If either type fails to articulate at either level, 
the existence of the nation will be jeopardized and will most probably 
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result in an identity crisis. This is precisely the case of Taiwan ever 
since the 1990s. To be sure, the escalation of nationalist politics can be 
viewed as a reflection of the growing institutional failure of the ROC 
nation, which leads, on the one hand, to an identity crises in Taiwan, 
and on other, to a resentment towards China.
Before I set forth my analysis of those institutional failures of the 
ROC, a brief historical sketch will help to clarify things. Prior to 1889, 
when Taiwan became a province of the Chinese Empire by the Qing 
Dynasty, the island of Taiwan, known as Formosa to Westerners, had 
been partially occupied by the Dutch, Spanish, Americans, and the 
Japanese, some of whom established administrative offices for short-
term rule. In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty 
and was under Japanese colonization for fifty years. As China was 
undergoing its modern nation-building process during the Republican 
period (from 1911 to 1945), Taiwan was becoming “Japanized” under 
Japanese colonialism at the same time.8 After Japan’s defeat in the 
Second World War in 1945, Taiwan was once again turned over to the 
then Chinese government, namely, the KMT regime. Four years later, 
the ruling KMT lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party and 
took refuge in Taiwan. Whereas the CCP founded the People’s Repub-
lic of China and gradually gained international recognition as the rep-
resentative state of China, the exiled KMT regime, insisting that its 
Table 1: Civic-Territorial and Ethno-Cultural Institutions of Nationhood on 
International and National Levels
Civic-territorial institutions 
(Political/territorial map)
Ethno-cultural institutions 
(Cultural/cognitive map)
International/ 
Global level
• International organizations
• International law
• Transnational arbitration 
system
• Diplomacy
• International cultural grammar 
of nationhood* (Löfgren 1989)
• International epistemic 
communities* (Haas 1992)
National/
Domestic 
level
• State sovereignty, territoriality, 
and citizenship
• Signifying institutions (national 
title, flag, anthem, etc.)
• “National culture”
• Language
• Cultural patrimonies
• “Nation-view” and knowledge 
systems (History, literature, 
etc.)**
Note: *On the concepts of “international cultural grammar of nationhood” and “inter-
national epistemic communities,” see further discussions in Wang (2004a).
**On the concepts of “nation-view” and “History” with a capital H, see Duara (1995).
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national title remain the “Republic of China,” continued to effectively 
be a state on Taiwan until 2000. While both the PRC and the ROC were 
competing to claim sovereignty over Taiwan by drawing on legacies of 
Chinese history, a third claim was made by nationalist supporters of 
the Taiwan Independence Movement, who insisted that Taiwan should 
become an independent nation-state that would be autonomous from 
China. The Democratic Progress Party, consisting of TI supporters in 
the main, was formed in 1986 and became the major opposition party.
Against this backdrop, the election of DPP-nominated Chen Shui-
bian as President of the ROC in 2000 marked a watershed in Taiwan’s 
history. Not only did it end the 55-year rule of the KMT on the island, 
but it also shifted the nation-building momentum of the ROC. How-
ever, as institutional analysis emphasizes the path dependence of histori-
cal development, there were enormous institutional legacies from the 
preceding KMT state that Chen’s new government could hardly do 
without. Suffice it to say that most of the signifying institutions of the 
ROC—the national title, national anthem, and national flag that the 
proponents of the independence movement had long vowed to over-
throw—were kept intact after Chen’s inauguration. This reveals the 
analytical power of the institutionalist approach that this study shall 
demonstrate, as many institutional crises and predicaments that the 
KMT created still haunt the succeeding DPP government. The central 
argument of this essay holds that the recent identity crisis in Taiwan 
has deep historical roots in ROC’s institutions. One cannot compre-
hend the situation after 2000 if one does not fully understand how the 
ROC institutions came into existence in the first place. The main body 
of the analysis, therefore, will focus on the situation before 2000, in 
which most references to the ROC government refer to the KMT state. 
The situation under the DPP rule, after 2000, will be discussed subse-
quently, and I shall show how ROC institutions have both enabled and 
constrained DPP’s pursuit of an independent nationhood.
Due to space limitations and for the sake of clarity, the following 
analysis will focus mainly on civic-territorial types of institutions. The 
far more complicated situations concerning ethno-cultural institutions 
should be dealt with separately.9
IV. Institutional Failures of the ROC Nation and their Effects
The current institutional shell under which Taiwan has been conceived 
of as a nation-state is that of the “Republic of China” built by the KMT 
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after 1949. Indeed, the KMT invested enormous efforts in building the 
ROC nation on Taiwan for various reasons. One of the major reasons 
was to legitimate its rule over the island by claiming that Taiwan was 
part of China and that the KMT was the only legitimate government of 
China. The other reason was to “clean up” the existing colonial legacies 
that Japan had left in Taiwan. Ironically, while the KMT was quite suc-
cessful in turning the Taiwanese people into Chinese by implementing 
these institutions, it unwittingly built a quasi-nation that was not origi-
nally intended. The pro-independence DPP took full advantage of this 
institutional shell to claim that Taiwan was already an independent 
nation-state when it came to power. More precisely, institutions of the 
ROC nation worked quite well on the domestic/national level (Table 1), 
but failed to function on the global/international level. These failures 
will be examined in three institutional sites: diplomacy, international 
organizations, and signifying institutions like national titles and the 
national flag.
A. The Tug of Diplomatic War: “Organized Hypocrisy” and ROC’s 
Struggles for Sovereignty
One of the major tasks assumed by nationalism is to build (or main-
tain) a sovereign state, whereas state sovereignty, as Stephen Kras-
ner has bluntly put it, is nothing more than “organized hypocrisy.”10 
According to the logic of organized hypocrisy, sovereignty and terri-
toriality are, to a large extent, dependent upon the approval by others, 
regardless of the de facto ruling capacity and jurisdiction of a regime. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of Taiwan. After its retreat to 
Taiwan, the KMT state still insisted that it was the only legitimate gov-
ernment of China, despite the fact that it had lost over 99% of its ter-
ritory, including the capital Nanking (now Nanjing). Nonetheless, the 
backing of the United States ensured and perpetuated the persistence 
of such a fictitious claim of legitimacy. The majority of other states 
initially supported the ROC and accordingly refused to recognize the 
PRC. Although the 1950s and the 1960s saw a growing number of 
countries switching their recognition to PRC, the ROC was still able to 
maintain a greater number of diplomatic ties than the PRC (see Table 
2). As the Cold War strategy by the West was to keep Communist 
China alienated from the world, the KMT state, maintaining the fiction 
of being the sole and legitimate government of the whole of China, 
still kept its seat as the representative of China in the U.N. The turning 
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point came in October 1971, when the General Assembly of the U.N. 
adopted Resolution 2758 recognizing the People’s Republic of China as 
the sole legitimate representative government of China and moved to 
“expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place 
which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the 
organizations related to it.”11
In fact, Taiwan was given a chance to remain in the U.N. in 1971, but 
its then-President, Chiang Kai-shek, refused to give serious consider-
ation to that proposal, adhering to a belief in the nationalist doctrine 
that there could not be two Chinas.12 No matter how “contingent” this 
decision might have been, it determined the institutional setup that 
was to decisively shape the development of Taiwan’s nationalist poli-
tics in the later years.
As Anthony Giddens puts it, “[n]ation-states only exist in systemic 
relations with other nation-states.”13 Diplomatic relations, therefore, 
are one of the crucial manifestations of a state’s sovereignty. Conversely, 
the lack of diplomatic relations implies the absence of state sovereignty 
and the non-existence of the nation. This is where organized hypocrisy 
assumes center stage. To compete for the claim of being the only legiti-
mate state of the Chinese nation, the ROC and the PRC have been wag-
ing diplomatic wars—a zero-sum game—by extinguishing each other’s 
diplomatic ties. Since the ROC and the PRC did not recognize each 
other, they did not allow double recognition either. When a third-party 
country established diplomatic ties with one side, the other side would 
sever formal relations with that country. Although in recent years the 
ROC has tried to loosen up this policy to compensate for its ever-dete-
riorating diplomatic situation, the PRC is holding more tightly to this 
zero-sum standpoint.
Table 2 illustrates the tug-of-war between the “two Chinas.” Before 
1971, the ROC was able to outnumber and out-maneuver its archri-
val in diplomatic ties. However, ever since 1971, this situation has 
reversed. The ROC’s number of diplomatic ties dropped drastically 
after its expulsion from the U.N., while the 1980s witnessed the worst 
years of the ROC’s diplomatic situation: the number of diplomatic ties 
dropped to 22, which accounted for merely 13% of the total countries 
in the world.
With the efforts of “pragmatic diplomacy” in the late 1980s, the 
situation improved somewhat, but only by a slight margin. The situ-
ation became worse after DPP’s rule in 2000. As pointed out, the DPP 
has conveniently inherited the ROC’s institutional shell to adduce the 
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Table 2: Countries with Diplomatic Ties to the ROC and the PRC, Selected Years*
ROC’s PRC’s
Total of diplomatic diplomatic
Year Countries ties Percentage ties Percentage
1950 44  23
60 59  42
66 66  51
69 69  50
70 67  54
71 56  74
72 147 42 29%  85 58%
73 149 38 26%  89 60%
74 150 32 21%  97 65%
75 156 27 17% 106 68%
76 157 26 17% 111 71%
77 158 23 15% 114 72%
78 161 22 14% 116 72%
79 164 22 13% 120 73%
80 166 22 13% 124 75%
81 168 23 14% 124 74%
82 168 23 14% 125 74%
83 169 24 14% 129 76%
84 170 25 15% 130 76%
85 170 23 14% 133 78%
86 171 23 13% 133 78%
87 171 23 13% 133 78%
88 171 22 13% 136 80%
89 171 26 15% 135 79%
90 170 28 16% 135 79%
91 187 29 16% 138 74%
92 189 29 15% 152 80%
93 190 30 16% 159 84%
94 190 29 15% 160 84%
95 191 30 16% 161 84%
96 191 30 16% 161 84%
97 191 29 15% 161 84%
98 191 27 14% 163 85%
99 191 29 15% 162 85%
2000 191 29 15% 162 85%
01 191 28 15% 163 85%
02 192 27 14% 165 86%
03 192 27 14% 165 86%
04 192 26 14% 166 86%
Source: Wei 1991: 2; Gao 1994: 58-9; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Note: *The numbers indicate the total of diplomatic ties at the end of each year.
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claim that Taiwan is already an independent country. Actualizing such 
a claim, however, requires comprehensive diplomatic recognition. In 
response, the PRC has become ever more dogmatic on its “One China” 
policy and has taken harsher measures to oust Taiwan from the inter-
national arena. This leads us to another battleground, namely, interna-
tional organizations.
B. Participation in International Organizations
Another institutional site in which state sovereignty is embodied is 
that of international organizations.14 Indeed, the proliferation of 
international organizations should not be seen as the growing tran-
scendence of the nation-state; on the contrary, it is one in which the 
universal scope of the nation-state has been established, and in which 
nation-statehood has been constructed.15 Because the United Nations is 
the major institution of international society, expulsion from the U.N. 
thereby disqualified the ROC’s membership in all U.N.-related organs 
and most intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Table 3 shows the 
declining memberships of the ROC in IGOs as compared with other 
“divided nations,” such as Korea and formerly Germany.16
As we can see, Taiwan’s membership in IGOs dropped drastically 
between 1966 and 1997, in sharp contrast to the PRC’s rapid rise since 
the ’70s. The late ’80s witnessed Taiwan’s worst years of international 
Table 3: IGO Membership Figures for Taiwan (ROC), PRC, and 
Other “Divided Nations”
Year
Country 1960 1966 1977 1988 1997 2004
Taiwan (ROC) 22 39 10  6 11   46
PRC  2  1 21 37 52  544
Korea, South 19 29 39 42 51  500
Korea, North  2  3 12 22 18  195
Germany, West 70 85 87 82 1831 1237Germany, East  4  5 34 47
Hong Kong2  0  2  4 11 14   84
Source: Union of International Associations (1997/98), Appendix 3 – Table 3; Union of 
International Association (2004/05), Appendix 3 – Table 2; Weng (1990: 30), Table 1.
Note: 1East and West Germanys were unified in 1990.
2Hong Kong was formerly a British colony before 1 July 1997, and is now a Special 
Administrative Region of the PRC.
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connection, with its membership in IGOs plunging into single digit 
figures. That was not the case for the other “divided nations.” Even 
North Korea, which has been known for its longtime international 
isolation, is in a better position than Taiwan. At the bottom of the table, 
Hong Kong is added as another case in point. A British colony in 1988 
and a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in 1997, Hong Kong 
enjoyed better international connections than Taiwan, even though it 
did not have nation-state status. If we turn to non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), the story is different and more complicated (see 
Table 4). Although the PRC has deliberately obstructed Taiwan’s mem-
bership in international organizations, it is simply impossible to bar 
Taiwan’s entry into all NGOs, since there are too many of them (well 
over 20,000). This is considered advantageous by the ROC government 
and a chance to compensate for its losses on the diplomatic battlefield. 
Therefore, the state has deliberately (and desperately) promoted par-
ticipation in all kinds of NGOs in order to symbolically “claim sover-
eignty.”
In the 1970s, despite the fact that the PRC was able to reverse 
international diplomacy in favor of itself, China still remained quite 
isolated from international communities (with only 71 NGO member-
ships), while Taiwan was relatively more active in NGOs than its rival. 
Although the PRC’s membership in the NGOs climbed in the 1980s and 
eventually exceeded that of the ROC in the 1990s, the ROC remained in 
better shape in the NGOs than it did in the IGOs, since its membership 
did not fall too far behind the PRC and that of other divided nations.
Table 4: NGO Membership Figures for Taiwan (ROC), PRC, and 
Other “Divided Nations
Year
Country 1960 1966 1977 1988 1997 2004
Taiwan (ROC) 108  182  239  574  908  2547
PRC  30   58   71  517 1136  3466
Korea, South 102  209  371  779 1200  3229
Korea, North  22   48   63  138  185   391
Germany, West 841 1115 1399 2406 132911 10210Germany, East 102  183  393  793
Hong Kong2  93  164  312  690 1070  2800
Source: Same as Table 3.
Note: Same as Table 3.
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Two factors account for the exacerbation of the institutional crises 
experienced by the ROC nation in the recent decades. The first con-
cerns the rising role of the PRC. As shown in Table 4, PRC’s member-
ships in NGOs doubled from 1988 to 1997, and then tripled from 1997 
to 2004. This clearly indicates that China has become a much more 
active participant in international communities and is much more 
open to outsiders. The impacts on Taiwan are twofold: On the one 
hand, PRC’s participation in either IGOs or NGOs often demanded the 
exclusion of Taiwan, or the downgrading of Taiwan’s membership. As 
a consequence, the condition for Taiwan’s participation in international 
communities, either in state or non-state terms, is becoming increas-
ingly difficult. On the other hand, the PRC’s rising role in international 
society has significantly changed outsiders’ perceptions of “China” 
and “the Chinese.” These impacts, profound and widespread in not 
only political but also cultural, social, and economic realms, shall be 
discussed in a later section.
The second factor for the ROC’s worsening institutional crises lies in 
the discrepancy between the state and society in terms of their interac-
tion with international communities. Combining Tables 3 and 4, we 
find that, on the one hand, the state experiences increasing constraints 
as its membership in IGOs significantly lags behind most other states, 
whereas, on the other hand, Taiwan’s civil society has significantly 
increased its interaction with international communities. As the inter-
action between Taiwan and the global community accelerates, there 
emerges coterminously a rising awareness of the awkward situation 
of Taiwan in the international setting. There also emerges a rising 
collective anxiety within Taiwanese society concerning the country’s 
membership/status in those international organizations, such as the 
United Nations, GATT/WTO, and the Olympics, among numerous 
others. Here we encounter a critical issue of Taiwan’s national identity; 
namely, the signifying institutions, which include the naming system 
and representational symbols of the collectivity.
C. “What’s in a Name?”: The ROC and Its Misnomers
In his theoretical elaboration on language and symbolic power, French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has made a point so illuminating to the 
case of Taiwan that it is worth quoting in extenso:
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The social sciences deal with pre-named, pre-classified realities which 
bear proper nouns and common nouns, titles, signs and acronyms. At 
the risk of unwittingly assuming responsibility for the acts of constitu-
tion of whose logic and necessity they are unaware, the social sciences 
must take as their object of study the social operations of naming and 
the rites of institution through which they are accomplished. But on a 
deeper level, they must examine the part played by words in the con-
struction of social reality and the contribution which the struggle over 
classifications, a dimension of all class struggles, makes to the constitu-
tion of classed—classes defined in terms of age, set, or social position, 
but also clans, tribes, ethnic groups or nations.17
Few, if any, countries suffer from naming as much as Taiwan does. 
The politics of naming, characterized by Bourdieu as “rites of insti-
tution,” has been playing a central part in nationalist politics, as the 
withdrawal of recognition of the ROC government has had a direct 
and profound impact on the naming system of Taiwan. Under pressure 
from the PRC, the national title “Republic of China,” which implies 
“two Chinas,” is no longer acceptable in most formal international 
settings. Unlike the case of other divided nations such as Korea and 
former Germany, U.N. Resolution 2758 has made it an institutional 
script that there is only “one China.” This institutional script is very 
important in understanding Taiwan’s national predicament. People 
know that there are “two Koreas” and that there used to be “two 
Germanys.” However, to speak of “two Chinas” nowadays appears 
as nonsensical as “two Americas.” On the other hand, the simple and 
straightforward term “Taiwan” was simultaneously unacceptable to 
the PRC nor desirable to the ROC under the rule of the KMT before 
2000. The use of “Taiwan” in the official title implies that Taiwan is an 
independent nation-state, which neither the PRC nor the KMT state 
of the ROC before 2000 (both of whom insisted that Taiwan is part of 
China) would be pleased to see. As a result, “how to name the politi-
cal community formed on this island” has become a thorny problem. 
Even abroad there are so many struggles to find a proper title for this 
community. They are best reflected in the variety of alternative official 
names used in the ROC’s overseas representative institutions (includ-
ing both official and “quasi” or “semi-official” liaison offices, shown in 
Table 5).
It is apparent from Table 5 that, for 1972, only 33% of overseas rep-
resentative institutions used the formal national title of the ROC, while 
the majority used simply Taiwan. However, the situation significantly 
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changed in the ’80s. In 1982, 49% of overseas foreign institutions that 
represented the ROC used the rather ambiguous and misleading term 
Far East (Oriente) as their official designated title. Fourteen percent of 
these institutions, mostly in European countries such as Spain, Bel-
gium, Switzerland, and Holland, used even more confusing terms such 
as “Sun Yat-sen Center,” as their official designated title. The combina-
tion of these two categories (63% in total) accounted for more than 
half of Taiwan’s representative institutions in foreign countries whose 
official designated titles carried neither the ROC’s national title, nor 
the geographical name of Taiwan, nor an ethno-cultural description of 
the ROC’s Chinese identity. Beginning with the government’s efforts 
at “pragmatic diplomacy” in the late ’80s, the situation has undergone 
significant alteration again. But there is only marginal improvement 
in this new naming strategy due in no small measure to the PRC’s 
increasing pressure on other countries. The use of the national title 
ROC increased marginally from 11% to 17%, but the more commonly 
known “Taiwan” dropped from 11% to a mere 4%. On the other hand, 
the misleading names such as “Far East” drastically dropped to 4%, 
while the most commonly used title (at 67%) is “Taipei,” the putative 
capital city of Taiwan.18 This formula appears to be acceptable to both 
the PRC and the ROC. From the PRC’s point of view, “Taipei” defines 
only a local government, just as “Hong Kong” once did. Conversely 
Table 5. Official Titles Used in Taiwan’s Overseas Representative Institutions*
Year
Titles 1972 1982 1992 2005
Republic of China 33% 11% 17% 22%
Taiwan 44% 11%  4%  2%
Chinese 11% 11%  2%
Taipei  3% 67% 68%
Far East/Oriente1 11% 49%  4%
ROC (Taiwan)2  6%  5%
Others3 14%  2%
Source: Compiled from Gao 1994: 124; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan).
Note: *Including embassies, consulates, and other “quasi-official” liaison offices in 
countries with no diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
1E.g., Far East Trade Service Inc. Lebanon Office; Centro Comercial Del Lejano Oriente, 
Lima, Republic del Peru.
2This formula uses the national title “ROC” followed by “Taiwan” in the parentheses in 
order not to be mistaken for China, the PRC.
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on the ROC’s side, “Taipei” is interpreted as a political authority par-
allel to that of “Beijing” or “Washington,” as is often used in Western 
media.
The problem of naming has also afflicted Taiwan’s membership in 
international organizations. Among many others, four formulae stand 
out as the most noteworthy. On the IGO side, Taiwan appears as “Tai-
pei, China” in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and as “Taiwan, 
China” in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).19 
On the NGO side, Taiwan appears as “Chinese Taipei” in the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee and as “Academy of Science located in Tai-
pei, China” in the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).20 
In addition, an even more unusual title of “Separate Customs Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” was used when the ROC gov-
ernment applied for membership in the GATT/WTO.
While the variety of these names appears confusing to outsiders, it 
is also admitted that, “if the name of our overseas representing institu-
tions is too wide of the mark, it will not only derogate our nationhood, 
but also strike the self-esteems of our nationals.”21 One can imagine 
how confusing it is to a foreigner who needs to go to a “Far East 
Trade Service Inc.” or a “Sun Yat-sen Center” in order to apply for a 
travel visa or other official document of Taiwan. For those who are 
from Taiwan, it is frustrating and sometimes humiliating to see that 
the name of their homeland appears under various guises. Even an 
ROC minister at the Sun Yat-sen Cultural Center in Belgium could not 
refrain from complaining: “Cultural Center? Who the hell knows what 
it is!”22 For those nationalist supporters of Taiwan Independence, it has 
become common practice to ridicule the ROC’s ever-changing names 
of its overseas institutions by characterizing the ROC as the “Republic 
of Cheating”23 or as the “Republic of Confusion.”24
Moreover, in addition to the national title, all signifying institutions 
pertaining to the ROC—from its national flag and national anthem to 
its passport and official documents—are not supposed to be accepted 
in international arenas. The importance of these institutions is, again, 
underscored in Bourdieu’s insightful argument:
The act of institution is thus an act of communication, but of a particular 
kind: it signifies to someone what his identity is, but in a way that both 
expresses it to him and imposes it on him by expressing it in front of 
everyone and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of what he 
is and what he must be.25
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In other words, identity is about both self-recognition and recogni-
tion by others.26 Thus, the failure of the ROC’s institutions has led 
to an identity crisis of its nationals in that, in front of others, there is 
no institutional way for them to signify who they are in a definite, 
“authoritative” manner. To be sure, the signifying institutions of the 
ROC have only domestic, without international, credibility. This awk-
ward situation in part accounts for the identity crisis in Taiwan. For 
instance, at the 1996 Olympic Games held in Atlanta, a Taiwanese 
overseas student was arrested by the U.S. police for waving the unrec-
ognized national flag of the ROC. The arrest, made at the request of a 
PRC official, was based on the regulations of the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC). According to the IOC’s regulations, it is prescribed 
that the national flag of Taiwan (whose membership appears as “Chi-
nese Taipei” rather than the “ROC”) should not appear throughout the 
Olympic Games, nor at any official occasion.27 This incident involving 
an individual was considered an insult to the entire Taiwanese society, 
since it once again reminded the public of the humiliating fact that 
the collective representations of their community (national title, flag, 
anthem) were not allowed to appear in the Olympic Games or most 
other international occasions. There was significant news coverage of 
this incident in the mass media, people anxiously discussed “national 
dignity” in the public sphere, and TI nationalists took this opportunity 
to ridicule the unrecognized ROC nation and advocated turning it into 
the “Republic of Taiwan.”28
The true irony of it all was in 2000 when the pro-TI DPP became 
the ruling party. Instead of a name change into “Republic of Taiwan,” 
the national title remained the “Republic of China.” It is apparent 
the insufficiency of the ethnic explanation of Taiwan’s national ques-
tion and the strength of institutional analysis. As Chen Shui-bian was 
elected the President of the ROC through a democratic election, his 
legitimacy stemmed from the institutions of the ROC. If he overthrows 
ROC’s institutions, he runs the risk of losing his legitimacy of rule. 
More importantly, if Chen ruthlessly changes the national title to the 
“Republic of Taiwan,” it would have been viewed as a serious and pro-
vocative act of “declaring independence.” Neither the PRC nor the U.S. 
would allow this to happen. This involves the triad dynamics between 
U.S.-Taiwan-China, which lies beyond the scope of this essay; however, 
the organized hypocrisy it entails has had a profound impact that is 
worth further consideration.
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V. The Trickle-Down Effects of Organized Hypocrisy: 
Identity Crises and Resentment
The failures and crises of the ROC nation have caused increasing diffi-
culties to the Taiwanese people during the globalization process in the 
past decade or so. Globalization increases the scope for people to inter-
act with the outside world through cross-border and trans-boundary 
activities, but the Taiwanese people are doing so only to find that their 
own country’s institutions do not really work. This can be understood 
in light of what can be called “the trickle-down effects of organized 
hypocrisy,” which is illustrated in Figure 1.
In the previous section, I have drawn on Stephen Krasner’s argu-
ment that the aim of civic-territorial institutions is to pursue state sov-
ereignty, which is nothing more than organized hypocrisy. Figure 1 
illustrates an ideal situation in which two states (state A and state 
B) grant each other sovereignty through organized hypocrisy on the 
level of high politics. Through the mediation of institutional effects, 
Figure 1: The “Trickle-Down Eﬀ ects” of Organized Hypocrisy
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the impact of organized hypocrisy may “trickle down” to the level of 
low or non-politics, which consists of fields and spheres that have been 
characterized as “private sectors,” “civil society,” or “life worlds” in 
different theoretical perspectives. If we use the term “politics” in its 
narrowest sense by confining it to practices and activities directly per-
taining to the state (as in “high politics”), then most affairs on this level 
are ordinarily considered as being of a low- or non-political nature. 
It is on this lower level that the non-state sectors of “world society” 
or “global (civil) society” are conceived, while “world culture” takes 
shape. On the other hand, there are feedbacks moving from the lower 
to the higher levels, which provide the existing state with legitimacy, 
support, pressures, rebellions, and more.
Figure 1 shows only a simplified model between two states, but this 
would hold good and can be generalized to a multi-state system as 
well. Since the institutional effects of the state have been resilient and 
durable, and since recent globalization entails increasing interactions 
and interconnectedness not only on the high-politics, but also on the 
low- or non-politics level, Figure 1 suggests that organized hypoc-
risy is seen not only in state sovereignty, but also in daily life that is 
ostensibly of a nonpolitical or apolitical nature. Indeed, globalization 
may have undermined the foundations of the nation-state and/or state 
sovereignty in a variety of ways, but it may also have strengthened 
organized hypocrisy by reinforcing the institutional prerogatives of 
the existing nation-state. This explains why Taiwan’s nationalist poli-
tics escalates rather than declines during the course of democratization 
and globalization. I shall analyze two aspects of this: identity crisis and 
resentment.
A. Struggles over Nomenclature and the Politics of Identity
The notion of identity implies something to be identified with. This 
“something,” however, requires a name or a “signifier” to exist in the 
first place. The construction of social reality postulates the institution of 
nomenclature, which, in turn, is constitutive of individuals.29 Without 
a name, the identity of actors cannot possibly be evoked. In this light, 
at the core of Taiwan’s identity crisis we find the problem of naming: 
there is no way of naming these people and their collectivity. Insofar as 
“nationality” and “citizenship” are concerned, the terms “China” and 
“Chinese” have been preempted by the PRC. When the two terms are 
used, they are meant to refer to the PRC, not the ROC. This is further 
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complicated by the problematic terms “Taiwan” and “Taiwanese” as 
used to refer to nation and nationality. Many outsiders have been per-
plexed by the following question: If the name “Republic of China” has 
brought Taiwan infinite problems, why can’t it just be replaced it with 
a new one such as the “Republic of Taiwan,” or simply “Taiwan”? That 
would solve its problems all at once. But indeed, there are profound 
complexities that attend the adoption of these solutions.
By the 1990s, the KMT state of Taiwan had maintained that Taiwan 
was not a country, but the ROC was. Although this rhetoric has gradu-
ally eroded since Lee Teng-hui assumed power, such a doctrine has left 
strong institutional legacies that even the successor Chen Shui-bian, 
who used to maintain that all symbolic institutions of the ROC should 
be overthrown, cannot do without. Furthermore, the state of the PRC, 
for deep nationalistic reasons, does not allow “Taiwan” for a country 
name either. Since the PRC also claims its sovereignty over Taiwan 
by seeing it as part of Chinese territory, to turn Taiwan into a country 
name would in effect disqualify its claim over the island. The PRC’s 
position is backed by its military forces, as it repetitively threatens 
to attack Taiwan should the latter declare independence. As a conse-
quence, there is no way to name the political community of Taiwan 
insofar as nation and nationality are concerned. Neither “Taiwan/Tai-
wanese” nor “China/Chinese” can serve the function of signifying the 
political community on this island. The identity crisis is to a large 
extent related to the problem of naming, but it cannot be easily solved 
by simply changing the name, since the change of name itself is under 
severe constraints resulting from organized hypocrisy. Commenting 
on such a predicament, a journalist lamented:
It is becoming increasingly difficult for our officials to refer to our own 
country. Our national title is surely “ROC,” but to speak of the “Republic 
of China” to foreigners, nine out of ten times it will be mistaken for the 
PRC across the strait. To speak of the “ROC on Taiwan,” it sounds awk-
ward and the listeners can make neither head nor tail of what it means. 
But to speak of “Taiwan,” we will be accused [by the PRC] of advocating 
Taiwan Independence. Thus, under the close examinations of the PRC, 
the unificationists, and the TI supporters, to refer to our country with-
out making mistakes…is like walking on a high wire; a slight slip of the 
tongue will cause troubles… . Taiwan’s current predicament lies exactly 
in not knowing how to be ourselves.30
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Thus, we can argue that the primary problem is not so much about 
identity itself as about the problem of naming and the signifying insti-
tutions. Institutions signify the existence of a collectivity such as a 
nation; conversely, the malfunction or dysfunction of these signify-
ing institutions jeopardizes the existence of such a collectivity. Only 
through this perspective can we understand why, whenever it comes 
to the thorny problem of the national question, there has been a rising 
anxiety that “Taiwan will gradually disappear from the world map,” 
since there is no institutional way through which it can signify its exis-
tence. The non-existence of the society in the institutional settings is 
accompanied by the sentiment of being an “international orphan” in 
the global village. In such circumstances, a deep resentment eventually 
arises.
B. Resentment and “Chain Reaction”
The longtime isolation of Taiwan (as a collectivity) from international 
society has brought about profound psychological effects to the col-
lective mentality in Taiwanese society that can be characterized as 
“resentment.” I use this term to follow a Nietzschean-Schelerian tradi-
tion of analysis. As is widely known, Friedrich Nietzsche first intro-
duced the concept of resentment to the world of modern thought, but 
it was another seminal German thinker, Max Scheler, who equipped 
the concept with full analytical power in his highly acclaimed but 
much neglected monograph Ressentiment.31 In his analysis, resentment, 
a characteristic of the rising bourgeoisie, is the most powerful and 
influential psychological locomotive in modern society. There are two 
sociological conditions that jointly lead to the rise of resentment: one is 
“theoretical comparability” and the other is “the discrepancy between 
theoretical (expected) and factual (actualized) status.” The impact of 
resentment, profound and long lasting, eventually leads to what Sche-
ler called “value-shifts” or “transvaluations” in the modern world. In 
this sense, nationalism can be seen as a manifestation of transvalua-
tions resulting from resentment, as Liah Greenfeld32 has convincingly 
demonstrated in her comparative study of nationalism in five coun-
tries.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, current nationalist politics in Tai-
wan have been characterized by undisguised ressentiment—ressenti-
ment towards each other and towards the outside world.33 The two 
sociological preconditions of ressentiment are particularly relevant to 
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Taiwan. Taiwan’s de facto statehood makes a majority of people think 
that Taiwan is theoretically comparable to other sovereign nation-states 
in terms of rights and status. However, there exists a huge discrepancy 
when it comes to actualizing such a right and status, since its coun-
terparts rarely recognize it as a state, in addition to the fact that it has 
been constantly excluded from international society. What is worse, 
although Taiwan is not officially recognized as a state, many outsiders 
simply “misrecognize” Taiwan as a state. Such a confusing and incon-
sistent situation, which is herein characterized as a “neither-nor” status 
(neither a state nor a non-state), makes the contrast between “theoreti-
cal comparability” and the discrepancies (between the theoretical and 
the actual) even more acute and absurd. The issues thus involved are 
of various kinds, ranging from the most macro collective level, such as 
membership in the United Nations or WHO (World Health Organiza-
tion), to the most micro individual level, such as passports and visas.34
The two sociological preconditions of ressentiment have existed for 
decades, but they had not received due attention from the wider public 
until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when democratization and ethnic 
mobilization undermined the KMT’s rule as well as the legitimacy of 
the ROC. Furthermore, as Taiwanese society became more open to 
the outside world during the new tide of globalization, the discrepan-
cies between “theoretical comparability” and the actual situation have 
become much more widely perceived. In such circumstances, ressenti-
ment emerges as a result, and it is further fueled by increasing repres-
sion from the PRC. In other words, it is a response to the intensifying 
new Chinese nationalism that characterizes the PRC in recent years.
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003 pro-
vides us with vivid illustrations of the ressentiment in Taiwan. When 
the first case of SARS was reported, the entire Taiwanese society was 
overwhelmed by this previously unknown disease that was believed to 
be of external origin. Its spread was transnational and its containment 
called for international cooperation, but Taiwan was intentionally left 
out of these efforts and received little help from the outside world 
for apparent political reasons. Worse yet, the PRC officials grandly 
announced to the world that Taiwan had been well taken care of by the 
Chinese government’s health system, notwithstanding the fact that Tai-
wan was not under PRC’s jurisdiction. Such a fictitious claim infuriated 
almost the entire Taiwanese society. Moreover, when Taiwan attempted 
to apply for observer membership in the World Health Assembly in 
May, the appeal was denied for the seventh consecutive time. The Chi-
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nese officials even made several harsh and caustic comments towards 
Taiwan both during and outside of the meeting. The reaction from 
Taiwan’s side burnt into an uproar of dismay. Some people used emo-
tional words such as “beast country” or “evil bandits” to characterize 
China. A high official in Taiwan commented, “Communists were too 
detestable. We are pissed off.”35 Not only state officials were chagrined. 
A sense of injustice was widespread in public opinion. Advocates of 
Taiwan Independence seized this moment to reiterate their conviction 
that China was an uncivilized hegemonic power that Taiwan should 
remain independent from, and that Taiwan should make all the more 
effort to pursue a recognized statehood in international society.
The rising tide of nationalism in China in the past decade makes 
the PRC take an even harsher stance on the Taiwan issue. Not only 
does it issue numerous warnings against Taiwanese nationalism, but 
it has also been making more effort to oust Taiwan from international 
society. The effects of such acts, however, have had a contrary effect. 
The harsher Chinese nationalism becomes, the more it pushes Taiwan 
away. As Ernest Renan puts it, suffering is more powerful than joy to 
mobilize nationalist sentiments: “Where national memories are con-
cerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, 
and require a common effort.”36 This is particularly true of the Taiwan-
ese case. By making the Taiwanese people “suffer together,” China’s 
new nationalism has strengthened rather than weakened its Taiwanese 
counterpart.
Figure 2: “Chain Reaction of Nationalist Politics in China and Taiwan”
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The two nationalisms on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are there-
fore interlocked and mutually reinforcing. Their respective strengths 
intensify each other. The more nationalistic the one side becomes, the 
stronger its counterpart grows. The fundamentalists on both sides are 
mobilizing their followers for tragic sacrifice at all costs. This situation 
can be portrayed as “chain reactions,” as illustrated in Figure 2.37 As 
can be imagined, the possible result of their impact can be profound 
and devastating. War, for instance, is a possibility that worries many.
VI. Other Factors and Prospects: How to Untie the Gordian Knot?
As pointed out in the beginning, the divided-nation model tells only a 
half-truth of cross-Strait relations, while the other half of non-truth illu-
minates the very core of Taiwan’s national question. All other divided 
nations after WW II sought reunification—Vietnam and Germany did 
it, while the two Koreas (North and South) are still on their way, slowly 
inching forward. The case of China and Taiwan is perhaps the only 
exception. Why?
I’m not suggesting that the lack of international recognition is the 
only cause of Taiwan’s national question, nor am I hinting that, once 
Taiwan’s international status is solved, its national question will disap-
pear. The legacy of Japanese colonialism and the tragic February 28 
Incident, in which the distinctions, along with the hostilities, between 
two major “ethnic groups” began to emerge, should not be left out of 
the picture. These factors certainly confound the problem. However, 
we can make a bold argument that, had there been an institutional 
script for “two Chinas” in international society, then Taiwan’s national 
question would have taken a different shape and become much easier 
to solve. There might still be an independence movement, but its scope 
would not be as wide as we see today. Much of the appeal of Taiwanese 
nationalism has been constructed as a negative narrative, first against 
the Mainlanders and the KMT, and now against the PRC. The resent-
ment against China has become deep-seated and widespread. There 
is a popular joke about elections, saying that the Chinese Communist 
Party is “the best campaigner” for the DPP (or TI), because the harsher 
China treats Taiwan, the farther it pushes Taiwanese people away from 
identification with China. The “One China policy” has strengthened 
the resentment of the Taiwanese people. By paralyzing the institutions 
of the ROC, it has brought great hardship to the Taiwanese people and 
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has thus forced them to lend sympathy or support to the ever-growing 
Taiwanese nationalism.
In addition, many Chinese people are actively and aggressively 
participating in “organized hypocrisy” by ousting Taiwan from inter-
national society, or by downgrading Taiwan’s membership in non-gov-
ernmental organizations. This forces Taiwanese participants to change 
their name into “Taiwan, China” or other forms that symbolically sig-
nify that “Taiwan is part of China.”38 These acts are not helpful in 
improving cross-Strait relations. In effect, by antagonizing the Taiwan-
ese people and reinforcing their resentment, they are harmful acts.
As a matter of fact, the state and people on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait feel that they are bullied, mistreated, or discriminated against 
in international society. The resultant negative feelings of resentment 
further fuel nationalistic sentiments on both sides. The escalation of 
nationalism in both Taiwan and China is certainly not a good thing. It 
may fall into a vicious cycle (“chain reaction”) in which the strengthen-
ing of the one will certainly lead to the strengthening of the other.
Cross-Strait interactions during the past few years are another 
newly emerging and highly complicated issue that deserves a sepa-
rate study. Although the political situation has been in a stalemate for 
decades, there has emerged a rapidly growing and expanding interac-
tion between non-governmental sectors on both sides. The most sig-
nificant is in the economic sector, as numerous Taiwanese business 
and enterprises swarm to invest in the PRC. What their impact on 
Taiwan’s national question will be remains unknown, as there are too 
many variables that cannot be definitely determined. Some may hold 
an optimistic hope that the increasing interaction between Taiwan and 
China will help people on both sides understand each other and, thus, 
during the process, the “Taiwan problem” can be solved in a peaceful 
way. This can happen, but only on the presupposition that people on 
both sides can momentarily put aside their nationalistic view towards 
each other, and a better mutual understanding can be achieved during 
the process. From my observations during field studies of Taiwanese 
migrants in Shanghai, however, this does not seem to be the case.39
In terms of its international status, Taiwan can be said to be a politi-
cal oddity in contemporary world politics. Although the PRC has reiter-
ated time and again that the so-called “Taiwan problem” is a “domestic 
affair of China” and that it will not tolerate intervention by outsiders, 
such claims, stated in overt nationalistic tones, are themselves symp-
tomatic of the international nature of Taiwan’s national question. As 
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we have seen, Taiwan’s relations with China have been internationally 
framed from its very beginning and have been reframed by interna-
tional/geopolitical factors repeatedly—first by the imperial invasion 
and colonialism, then the Second World War, then the Cold War, and 
now the Realpolitik between strong powers such as the PRC, the U.S., 
and Japan, among others. It is now an open secret that the U.S. has 
used Taiwan as a card to play the game against China, and that it is in 
the U.S.’s best interests to play the “two-hand strategy” with Taiwan 
by keeping it a political oddity; in other words, by maintaining its 
ambiguous international status as neither a state nor a non-state—a 
quasi-state, indeed. While the U.S. does not allow Taiwan to become 
fully independent, it protects it from military acts by the PRC by arm-
ing the island. It is thus not surprising that the PRC often accuses those 
advocates of Taiwan Independence as being “lackeys of American 
Imperialism” because, by cooperating with the U.S., they are in effect 
getting in the way of PRC’s interests in favor of those of the U.S. How-
ever, such an accusation is unjustifiable to the extent that the PRC does 
not really understand what the Taiwanese people have been suffering 
from because the main pillars of their social institutions do not hold.
If Taiwan’s national question is indeed internationally framed by 
outside factors, it follows that there is room for outsiders to help the 
people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to untie the Gordian knot. 
Here, Figure 1 is illuminating. State sovereignty is organized hypoc-
risy that can trickle down to ordinary people and daily life, but it 
does not mean that ordinary people must only be passive recipients of 
such hypocrisy. Indeed, there is room for ordinary people to maneu-
ver against the state’s hypocrisy, or even the hypocrisy itself can be 
changed. Some commentators have argued that six major actors are at 
play in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triad: the U.S. government, U.S. people, 
the Taiwanese government, the Taiwanese people, the Chinese govern-
ment, and the Chinese people. The high politics on the intergovern-
mental level is perhaps out of reach for ordinary people, but if people 
on all the sides can better understand the current situation, then there 
is a better chance to untie the knot by resorting to a solution that flows 
from the bottom rather than from the top. In addition to pressuring 
their own governments, people of other nations can help civil society 
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to reduce their feelings of resent-
ment—resentment not only towards each other, but also against the 
outside world—by not endorsing organized hypocrisy in non-political 
issues as well as in daily life. Such an appeal might sound feeble or 
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even naïve to many, but it seems to be the most feasible and reasonable 
action that almost everybody can take, not only to reduce the tensions 
across the Strait, but to alleviate peoples’ resentments embodied in 
various deleterious ideological forms, such as racism, terrorism, fun-
damentalism—and of course, nationalism. •
Notes
1. This paper is in part a result of the research project NSC93-2412-H-001-026 sponsored 
by the National Science Council, Taiwan. All Chinese names and characters are roman-
ized in pinyin, unless there is a common usage that has gained wide popularity (e.g., Tai-
pei, Chiang Kai-shek). To follow the convention in Taiwan, however, a dash is inserted 
between the second and third characters of the given name where applicable, although it 
is acknowledged that this practice does not conform to the pinyin rule developed by the 
People’s Republic of China.
2. It should be also noted that the classification of these “ethnic groups” is in itself prob-
lematic and has been in dispute in Taiwan’s nationalist politics. I use these two catego-
ries only for the purpose of illustration and convenience without indeed subscribing to 
them.
3. Brubaker 1996, p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 30.
5. Smith 1991, p. 82; Brubaker 1992.
6. Jepperson 1991.
7. Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987.
8. As will be made clear later, Japanese colonialism had a profound impact on Taiwan’s 
identity politics. For further reference, see Ching (2001) and Wu (2003).
9. For those who are interested, see Wang (2004a).
10. Stephen Krasner 1999.
11. United Nations 1971, p. 36.
12. Weng 1990: 61; Chen Lung-chu 1996: 191.
13. Anthony Giddens 1985, p. 4.
14. McNeely 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999.
15. Giddens 1985, p. 264; McNeely 1997.
16. The term “divided nation,” put in quotation marks here, follows the conventional 
usage. However, if we take into consideration that the nation is parasitic on the state, 
then the notion of “divided nation” becomes problematic. This example shows once 
again how elusive the notion “nation” has become in our daily usage.
17. Bourdieu 1991, p. 105, italics in original.
18. However, one should not make the mistake of considering Taipei the capital of the 
ROC, since, according to the Constitution, the ROC’s capital is Nanking (now Nanjing), 
located in mainland China. This is another example of institutional legacies that the new 
DPP government can hardly do without.
19. In both the cases of Interpol and ADB, the ROC as a member initially represented 
China until China itself became a member of these organizations in 1984 and 1986, 
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respectively. This brought into effect name changes. Thus, the ROC was renamed “Tai-
wan, China” in Interpol and “Taipei, China” in ADB. The ROC immediately protested 
against these name changes since both titles carried the political implication that Tai-
pei/Taiwan was an inherent part of China (the PRC). But in order to avoid possible 
expulsion, the ROC compromised and accepted the ADB formula (Taipei, China) “under 
protest.” However, it has not accepted the “Taiwan, China” formula so far, nor has it 
withdrawn its membership from Interpol (Weng 1990).
20. Ibid.
21. Gao 1994, p. 123.
22. United Daily News, 19 August 1994.
23. Zhuang 1995, p. 27.
24. For instance, see Lin Zhuo-shui 1992, pp. 71–74. Lin writes a short satire in which 
a European businessman, having no clue where to apply for travel documents for the 
“Republic of China” after mistakenly visiting the PRC’s consulate, is further confused by 
Taiwan’s various titles for overseas representative institutions (such as “Far East Trade 
Center”).
25. Bourdieu 1990, p. 121.
26. Calhoun 1994, p. 20; Berger and Luckman 1967, p. 132.
27. Central Daily News, 3 August 1996, p. 2.
28. Liberty Times, 4 August 1996.
29. Berger and Luckmann 1967, p.132.
30. Zhang Hui-ying 1997.
31. In their writings, both Nietzsche and Scheler (Max Scheler 1998) intentionally use the 
French word ressentiment because they think there is no counterpart in German that can 
signify the same meaning. The English translation of Scheler’s work retains the word in 
its French form. To make for a smooth read, however, I shall use “resentment” and “res-
sentiment” interchangeably.
32. Liah Greenfeld 1993.
33. See “Ressentiment in Modern Communities: Some Preliminary Reflections on Tai-
wan’s Experience” (Wang 2004c). The discussion in this and the next few paragraphs has 
been carried out at further length in that essay.
34. I have discussed these issues at further length in other places. See Wang (2004a, 
2004b).
35. China Times, 3 June 2003.
36. Renan 1996, p. 53.
37. As indicated in Figure 2, Chinese nationalism also has international causes that are 
not dealt with in this essay. For further discussions, see Wang (2004c).
38. Instances of this kind have been numerous, ranging from academic conferences to the 
cyberspace of the Internet. Many popular websites are pressured not to list Taiwan as a 
“country,” while some list Taiwan as a “province of China.”
39. Wang forthcoming.
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